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Abstract: This paper focuses on the designing procedure of a regulatory framework in distribution networks with the
main goal being to facilitate the integration of distributed generation (DG) units. The proposed framework is based
on the concept of the reward penalty scheme (RPS) and creates eﬀective financial incentives for distribution companies
(DISCOs) in improving the quality of their services by applying DG units. To achieve this goal, reliability indices and
annual energy losses of a distribution network are considered as two significant measures used in designing the structure
of several RPSs. Employing these schemes, the regulators can quantify the quality of services provided by DISCOs. In
order to examine the abilities of the proposed method, a case study on a test distribution system connected to bus 6
of the RBTS is performed. The obtained results show that a well-designed regulatory scheme can motivate DISCOs to
adopt higher penetration of DG in such a way that their technical criteria can be improved.
Key words: Distributed generation, incentive-based regulation, reliability, reward penalty scheme

1. Introduction
In both vertically integrated and restructured power systems, electricity distribution companies (DISCOs) have
a natural monopoly [1]. In such an environment, companies have no tendency to employ new technologies and
more eﬃcient procedures to improve their economic eﬃciency and service quality unless an appealing rate of
return is oﬀered by regulators to recover the cost associated with the adoption of such technologies. These
conditions become worse in cases where system regulations are designed based on performance-based regulation
(PBR) [2]. In response, electricity distribution regulators try to provide some financial incentives with the main
goal of adopting new technologies in the distribution sector. In the case of distributed generation (DG) resources
(i.e. any kind of electricity generation units directly connected to the distribution network [3]), regulators
around the world have proposed diﬀerent incentive-based mechanisms to motivate both DISCOs and investors
in installing these units in the distribution networks [4–6]. The main idea behind these supporting regulations is
to guarantee an acceptable level of profit for DG investors. However, such regulations are insuﬃcient in providing
surety for diﬀerent technical benefits of the DG units [7]. In other words, under these supporting regulations,
the installation of DG units can have unpredictable (i.e. positive or negative) eﬀects on the performance of
distribution networks. For instance, ineﬃcient integration of DG units can increase the required investment costs
for network reinforcement and increase power losses at large penetration levels [8]. The economic regulation of
∗ Correspondence:
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DISCOs and network tariﬀs for grid users have been introduced as the main tools that can be used to address
this problem [9]. In this paper, assuming that the DISCOs are under PBR, we tried to design indirect financial
incentives based on performance measures that can be improved by an eﬃcient integration of DG resources. As
a result, it can be expected that employing such regulations will motivate the DISCOs to eﬃciently integrate
DG units in order to improve the performance measures of their networks. To this end, we will take advantage
of the reward penalty scheme (RPS) because distribution system regulators in many countries have adopted the
RPS as an eﬀective tool for regulating service quality [10].
There has been significant activity in the literature addressing the problem of RPS design. In [2], a
risk assessment methodology was proposed to quantify the uncertainty associated with reliability indices. This
methodology was then employed in designing the procedure of some fair RPSs. In [11] and [12], fuzzy C-means
clustering was borrowed to eﬀectively categorize similar DISCOs, and the RPSs were designed for each cluster to
improve service reliability. In [13], the RPS was designed using data envelopment analysis (DEA). The authors
in [14] proposed a design method to equalize the total rewards and penalties arising from implementation of
the RPS in order to reduce the regulatory cost. None of these papers investigated the abilities of the RPS
to facilitate the eﬀective expansion of DG units. However, the impacts of economic and quality regulations
of distribution systems on the integration of DG have been investigated in many publications. In [15], a
method was proposed to quantify the incentives for DISCOs to integrate DG units into their grids. In [16],
economic regulations on DISCOs in Spain and Portugal were reviewed and, after the identification of gaps in
the regulatory tools and methodologies, several key alternatives were proposed. The analysis of traditional
distribution system regulations and how to improve them to accommodate higher levels of DG was followed in
[17]. State-of-the-art regulatory frameworks for integration of DG in some EU countries were reviewed in [18].
The authors in [19] proposed a second revenue stream based on the ability of DG units to reduce the outage risk
of consumers to incentivize DG integration in distribution networks. Nonetheless, the above-mentioned studies
only considered the DISCOs’ perspectives and did not consider the potential of the regulatory framework to
address the aforementioned issues. To the best of our knowledge, the incentives for DG integration have not been
considered in the designing procedure of the RPS. Hence, this paper mainly focuses on a design procedure of
the RPS with the main goal of motivating DISCOs to eﬃciently employ DG resources. Improving the reliability
level of customers together with reducing energy losses in distribution networks are two technical criteria that
are involved in the design of the RPS.
2. Reward penalty scheme
As mentioned before, the main goal of this paper is to propose an applicable and eﬀective method for eﬃcient
integration of DG units using the RPS. The RPS is a regulatory tool that creates a link between a quality index
(e.g., reliability indices) and a company’s revenue [20]. In this scheme, regulators define an acceptable level of
the quality index as a target value or benchmark. A company will be penalized if it cannot satisfy this target.
Alternatively, it will receive a bonus for a performance that surpasses the target.
A general form of the RPS is depicted in Figure 1 [13]. This curve shows the relation between the level
of quality index and the amount of reward or penalty. As shown in the figure, the main parameters of RPS
curves are the benchmark, dead bandwidth, incentive rate, reward cap, and penalty cap. The dead band is a
zone around the benchmark in which neither the penalty nor reward is exposed [10]. Beyond this zone, whether
a DISCO receives a bonus or incurs a penalty depends on the value of its quality index [21]. It should be noted
that the smaller values of most indices that are usually used in the RPS (e.g., reliability indices and energy
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losses) represent better performance and, therefore, in Figure 1, the direction of improvement in the quality
index is considered to be right-to-left. The slope of the line between the reward point and reward cap point is
known as the reward ramp. This parameter indicates the amount of change in the value of the reward per unit
change in the quality index. In the same way, the slope of the line between the penalty point and penalty cap
point is called the penalty ramp [12]. In many RPSs, the reward ramp and penalty ramp are equal, known as
the incentive rate (IR) [10]. The value of the reward or penalty is also capped at a specific level in order to

Reward

limit the financial risks associated with the RPS [12].

Reward Cap
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Penalty Point

Penalty

Reward Cap
point

Penalty Cap
Point

Quality Index
Direction of
improvement

Reward Point

Penalty Cap

Reward Zone

Dead band

Penalty Zone

Figure 1. A general reward penalty scheme.

Once the values of the main parameters (e.g., benchmark, dead bandwidth, IR, reward, and penalty
caps) are set, the designing procedure of the RPS is complete. Although the main idea behind the RPS is
quite simple, there are many diﬃculties in designing and implementing a proper and fair RPS [20]. In the next
section, the design process of the RPS will be addressed in detail.

3. Structure of the proposed incentive scheme
In this section, a step-by-step algorithm is proposed to design the RPS in a way that provides adequate incentives
for a DISCO to eﬀectively integrate DG in its distribution network. Accordingly, the general structure of the
regulatory process associated with the RPS is shown in Figure 2. As presented in this figure, as the first step,
a suitable quality index should be chosen that considers the available data and regulatory goals. The RPS can
then be designed based on the selected quality indices. By designing the RPS, it can be applied to a DISCO
for a specific period of time (e.g., 1 year). After this period, the regulatory agency evaluates the outcomes and,
if necessary, modifies the RPSs for the next period.
In this paper, we emphasize the design process of the RPS. Hence, detailed information about the selection
of indices and the design of the RPS are presented in the following section. It is worth noting that although
choosing quality indices is done based on DG impacts on the distribution network, the RPS parameters are
calculated from economical and technical system data, e.g., historical reliability data, network energy loss,
customer interruption cost, and a DISCO’s revenue.
4119
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Figure 2. Flowchart of the regulatory process of the RPS.

3.1. Selection of the quality indices
As previously mentioned, the selected quality indices should satisfy the following constraints:
1) Suﬃcient data should be available to calculate them.
2) They should eﬀectively reflect the regulatory goals.
This paper mainly focuses on designing a regulatory procedure to motivate DISCOs to eﬀectively employ
DG. Therefore, selected indices should properly reflect the major benefits of DG resources for the distribution
network. Among the wide variety of benefits that can be expected from DG units, we consider their eﬀects on
distribution system reliability and energy losses. However, the proposed method is general and other benefits
of DG can be applied, as well.
In order to quantify the reliability level of power delivered to customers in the distribution network,
diﬀerent reliability indices have been introduced. These indices can be divided into two main categories: load
point and system indices [22]. The first group of indices illustrates the reliability level at an individual load
point, and the system indices show the reliability level of the whole network. RPSs are usually applied to
the average system reliability indices, e.g., the system average interruption duration index (SAIDI), system
average interruption frequency index (SAIFI), and average energy not supplied (AENS) [4,20]. Although these
fundamental indices are very important, there are some deficiencies associated with each of them [23,24]. Indeed,
the system average indices cannot always give a complete representation of the system [24]. As an example, they
do not provide any information about the load points whose reliability levels are significantly lower than the
average. Since DG resources can eﬀectively improve the reliability of such load points, it is essential to choose
an index to reflect this important issue. The other important eﬀect of DG on distribution system reliability is
to supply a portion of loads while an interruption occurs due to a problem at higher voltage levels. Hence, on
the basis of these observations, in this paper, the main eﬀects of DG are considered as follows:
1) Supplying some distribution loads once the upstream network is interrupted.
2) Improving the average system reliability indices.
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3) Providing higher reliability levels for the less reliable load points.
4) Reducing energy losses in the distribution network.
In order to quantify the above items, a set of appropriate indices should be used. Detailed information
about these indices and the design procedure of the RPS is described in the following section.
3.2. Scheme 1: designing the RPS associated with upstream network interruption
Since DISCOs are not responsible for interruptions that occur due to any failure at higher voltage levels (i.e.
generation and transmission outages), it is not fair to penalize them for this [21]. Hence, in this paper, an
incentive scheme that only contains a reward zone is proposed. This scheme is presented in Figure 3. The index
of this scheme is defined as the amount of load served by DG when the upstream network is unavailable. As
shown in Figure 3, the proposed scheme has two main parameters: the incentive rate and the reward cap. The
value of the reward cap is usually considered as a percentage of the DISCO’s annual revenue [10]. The incentive

Reward

rate of this scheme can also be determined using Eq. (1):

Reward Cap

Reward cap point

MWh

Figure 3. RPS proposed for Scheme 1.

IRSc1 = α × (IC − EP )

(1)

where IRSc1 is the incentive rate of Scheme 1, α is a correction coeﬃcient with a value between 0 and 1, IC is
the interruption cost, and EP is the electricity price.
The purpose of α is to realize the value of the interruption cost and to also provide a control to share the
profits of this scheme between customers and the DISCO. In some extreme examples, if the value of α equals
0 or 1, the total profits of Scheme 1 are distributed to customers or the DISCO, respectively.
3.3. Scheme 2: designing the RPS based on the average system reliability index
As previously mentioned, the most popular average system reliability indices used in RPSs are the SAIFI,
SAIDI, and AENS. For example, in Finland and Norway, the reliability index of the RPS is T-SAIDI and ENS,
respectively [25,26]. In general, the RPS diagram of this scheme is similar to the one presented in Figure 1.
However, it should be noted that in some countries, a variety of RPS graphs have been implemented to regulate
the average system reliability index. For instance, there is neither a dead band zone nor a reward/penalty cap in
the Norwegian scheme [25]. The benchmark value of this scheme is determined based on the historical reliability
data of the DISCO [21]. The dead zone width is considered as a percentage of the benchmark (usually 3% to
4121
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5%). The IR is calculated based on the interruption cost survey, and the reward and penalty caps are also
considered to be a percentage of the DISCO’s annual revenue [11]. Such methods have been utilized in many
countries such as Finland, Norway, and the UK [26].
3.4. Scheme 3: designing the RPS to consider less reliable load points
As mentioned earlier, the existence of an RPS based on the average system reliability index cannot necessarily
ensure that consumers at all load points receive an acceptable level of service reliability. Hence, a reliability
index based on the load point indices should be employed to take the eﬀects of the DG on these load points
into account. To this end, the reliability index of Eq. (2) is proposed in this paper:
∑
RISc3 =

(Ni (Ui − T h) × H0 (Ui − T h))
∑
(Ni × H0 (Ui − T h))

(2)

where RISc3 is the reliability index of Scheme 3, Ni is the number of customers at load point i , Ui is the
total annual interruption duration of the i th load point, Th is the threshold value, and H0 is the Heaviside
function. In other words, the quality index of Scheme 3 is defined based on the diﬀerences between total annual
interruption duration of less reliable load points and a threshold value. The threshold value can be considered
as a function of the mean and standard deviation of the historical SAIDI data using Eq. (3):
T h = mean(pdf (SAIDI)) + k × SD(pdf (SAIDI))

(3)

where mean(pdf (SAIDI)) and SD(pdf (SAIDI))are the mean and standard deviation of the probability
distribution function of the historical SAIDI, respectively, and k is a constant coeﬃcient (usually between
2.5 and 3.5).
Since the quality index of this RPS represents the less reliable load points, it is not reasonable to consider
a reward zone for this curve. As a result, the curve of this scheme can be developed, as shown in Figure 4.
This curve has two main parameters: the penalty ramp and penalty cap. As previously mentioned, the penalty
ramp is determined based on the interruption cost survey, and the penalty cap is considered to be a percentage
of the total annual revenue of the DISCO.

Penalty

Penalty Cap Point

Penalty Cap

Figure 4. RPS diagram related to Scheme 3.

3.5. Scheme 4: designing the RPS based on energy losses in the distribution network
The fourth RPS of the proposed regulatory framework tries to control the losses of the distribution network.
The index of this scheme is total annual energy losses of the distribution grid. The RPS curve of this scheme
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is similar to the one shown in Figure 1. The benchmark value can be determined from Eq. (4):
BSc4 = Lr × Load × (1 + β)

(4)

where BSc4 is the benchmark for Scheme 4, Lr is the target value of loss percentage, Load is the total annual
load of the previous year, and β is the annual load growth. Lr is determined based on improvement in the
historical data of network losses. As an example, in Iran, Lr is calculated using the data itemized in Table 1,
where L a is the percent of network losses associated with the previous year and E is the expected percent of
annual reduction in loss. The dead bandwidth is also considered to be a percentage of the benchmark value.
Table 1. Calculation of the target value of electricity distribution losses in Iran.
La La

≤ 10 10 ≤ La ≤ 12 12 ≤L

E

0

2

Lr

8

Lr = La

a

≤ 14 14 ≤ La ≤ 16 16 ≤ L

3

4

a

≤ 18 18 ≤ L

5

a

≤ 20 20 ≤ L

6

7

a

≤ 22 22 ≤ L
8

a

≤ 24 24 ≤ La
10

× (1 – E / 100)

The IR is determined based on average annual day-ahead market prices [15]. Finally, the reward and
penalty caps are considered as percentages of the total annual revenue of the DISCO. In the following section,
application of the proposed regulatory framework on the incentives for eﬃcient integration of DG in a test
distribution network is presented.
4. Case study
In order to investigate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed RPSs, a case study is presented in this section. In
this case study, the eﬀects of the designed RPSs on the incentives for DG integration in a distribution network
are evaluated. The study is conducted on the test distribution network connected to bus 6 of the RBTS. This
network has 4 feeders and 40 load points that supply a variety of load types (e.g., residential, agricultural, and
small industrial) [27]. Detailed information and data for this system can be found in [27]. In the following
section, the design process of the proposed RPSs is carried out and then the annual revenue of the test DISCO
aﬀected by these schemes is analyzed.
4.1. Designing the RPSs
As previously described, four diﬀerent RPSs are considered in the proposed method. In order to design each
RPS, the values of the parameters mentioned in Section 3 should be assessed. Accordingly, the maximum value
of total reward and penalty (i.e. the sum of the four schemes’ caps) is assumed to be 3% of the DISCO’s annual
revenue. The reward and penalty caps for each scheme are considered as a percent of the total cap according
to Table 2. Finally, the full database, including the test system data, DG energy price, network energy price,
and other parameters of the proposed RPSs, is available from the authors upon request.
Table 2. Reward and penalty caps of the proposed RPSs.

Scheme
Reward cap (% of total cap)
Penalty cap (% of total cap)

1
15
0

2
45
45

3
0
15

4
40
40

4123

JOOSHAKI et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

4.2. Case I: evaluation of the DISCO’s revenue without any DG integration plan
Values of the selected indices for the base case (i.e. without DG integration plans) and the reward or penalty
associated with each scheme are presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Values of the indices and associated reward or penalty in the base case.

Scheme
Index value
Reward or penalty (% of total revenue)

1
0 kWh
0

2
22.70 kWh
–1.0153

3
2.85 min
–0.1830

4
12.23%
–0.3021

As shown in this table, in this case, the DISCO being studied experiences penalty zones in all of the
schemes (except Scheme 1). According to Table 3, in this situation, the DISCO has to pay about 1.5% of its
annual revenue as quality-related penalties. In the following subsection, it is investigated whether the proposed
schemes can motivate the DISCO to consider the DG integration plans for addressing poor quality issues.
4.3. Case II: evaluation of the DISCO’s revenue considering DG integration plans
In order to investigate the eﬀects of the DG units on the DISCO’s annual revenue, in this case, an optimization
algorithm is presented to find the optimal expansion plans of the DG units. The formulation of this optimization
problem is addressed in Eqs. (5)–(12). Running this problem, the optimal size and location of the DG can be
found from the viewpoint of the DISCO. In this problem, it is assumed that the DISCO owns and operates the
DG units. However, this assumption does not limit the proposed framework and, in the case that the DISCO is
not allowed to own DG, this problem can be seen as a rough estimation that is made by the DISCO to indicate
the optimum capacity and place of the DG units considering DG investor requirements. Based on the obtained
results, the DISCO can then provide some incentives for DG investors to persuade them to optimally integrate
DG units in its network.
max (Π) = max (Rev − Cost + RP )
(5)

InvDG =

DG
Rev = EDG × P rE

(6)

Cost = InvDG + OpDG

(7)

N
DG
∑
i=1

(1 + r)U Li − 1
i
i
× CDG
× InvDG
r × (1 + r)U Li −1

OpDG =

N
DG
∑

OpiDG

×

i=1

EDG =

Nll
∑

i,l
PDG
× Tl

(8)

(9)

l=1
Nll
N
DG ∑
∑

i,l
PDG
× Tl

(10)

i=1 l=1

RP =

4
∑
i=1
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i,l
i
PDG
≤ CDG

(12)

Here, Π is the annual profit associated with the DG integration projects; Rev is the annual revenue associated
with the DG units; Cost is the annual cost associated with the DG units; RP is the total costs due to
DG
implementation of the RPSs; EDG is the annual energy produced by DG units; P rE
is the energy price
i
of DG units; InvDG and OpDG are the investment and operating cost of the DG; InvDG
and OpiDG are the

investment and operating cost of the ith DG; NDG is the total number of DG units; r is the interest rate;
i
is the capacity of the ith DG; Nll is the number of load levels;
U Li is the useful lifetime of the i th DG; CDG
i,l
PDG
is the power of the i th DG during load level l ;

T l is the duration of the l th

load level; and RPSCi

is the revenue from thei th RPS. In the simulation performed in this section, a single load level (annual average
i
load) is considered, and the decision variable associated with the DG size (i.e. CDG
) is continuous. It is worth

noting that in the presented DG placement optimization problem:
1. It is assumed that InvDG and OpDG are only functions of the size and output energy of the DG, respectively, and do not depend on the installation location. The investment and operating costs of the DG
is assumed to be 14,625 kRial/kW and 572 Rial/kWh, respectively. Furthermore, the decision variables
associated with the size of the DG is continuous, and the DG units are assumed to have been installed in
the medium-voltage network. It is worth noting that consumers who have their own DG are not modeled
in the study.
2. Costs associated with the four introduced RPSs (i.e. RP ) are a function of the performance indices of
these RPSs. Since the value of these indices are influenced by the size and location of DG units, RP is
also a function of the location and size of the DG. In order to calculate RP , the change of the regulatory
framework is not taken into account.
This optimization problem is treated with the genetic algorithm (GA) and the optimal locations of the
DG units for diﬀerent penetration levels (i.e. DG total capacity/average load ratio) are obtained. The annual
profit of the DISCO versus diﬀerent penetration levels of the DG units is illustrated in Figure 5. As can be
seen in this figure, the annual profit for low penetration levels (lower than 8%) is negative due to the penalties
incurred from the RPSs. However, in the case of higher penetration levels, the penalties associated with the
RPSs decrease and consequently the annual profit of the DISCO is positive. Moreover, once the penetration level
of the DG increases more than 32%, the value of annual profits starts to decrease. Therefore, for the DISCO in
question, a 30% penetration rate of DG can be a proper integration plan and the DISCO can eﬀectively guide
the company toward the reward zones of the RPSs.
In order to investigate the eﬀect of each scheme on the annual profit function, diﬀerent components of
the profit function are shown in Figure 6 and Table 4. As can be seen, the profits from Scheme 1 and Scheme
4 monotonically increase as the penetration level increases and reaches a maximum value at 20% and 24%,
respectively. The profit of Scheme 2 has an ascending trend with negative values in cases lower than a 32%
penetration rate. This can be translated into a low reliability level of the network (in the penalty zone), and
it gradually moves toward the dead zone, i.e. between 32% and 56% penetration rates. For penetration levels
higher than 60%, the DISCO then gains rewards from Scheme 2. Thus, it can be concluded that the reduction
in profit from 32% to 64% of the DG penetration level is caused by the dead zone of Scheme 2 and the reward
cap of Schemes 1 and 4.
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Figure 5. Annual profit of the DISCO for diﬀerent DG penetration levels.
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Figure 6. Components of the profit function.
Table 4. Components of the profit function.

Scheme 1
Scheme 2
Scheme 3
Scheme 4
Rev − Cost
Total

4126

Penetration level (%)
0
16
32
0
249.12
288.29
–390.27 –182.44 –17.87
–70.33
–36.96
–9.48
–114.84 496.06
768.79
0
–141.79 –285.18
–575.44 383.99
744.55

48
288.29
0
0
768.78
–428.90
628.17

64
288.29
52.43
0
768.78
–573.13
536.37

80
288.29
133.71
0
768.78
–717.27
473.51
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4.4. Sensitivity analysis
As thoroughly discussed in the numerical results, the dead zone width of the second scheme and also the caps
of Schemes 2 and 4 can significantly aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of the proposed regulatory framework. Thus, in the
next part, a sensitivity analysis is performed on these parameters.
4.4.1. Dead zone width of the second scheme
In order to investigate the eﬀect of this parameter on the profit function and the reliability level of the distribution
network, four diﬀerent values for this parameter are considered: 0%, 5%, 10%, and 15% of the benchmark
associated with Scheme 2.
The company’s profit associated with these values is illustrated in Figure 7. As can be seen in this figure,
for the RPS without a dead zone (0% dead zone width), the rise of profit function continues until about 56%
of the DG penetration level. However, beyond this value, the profit is decreased, which implies that for these
values the cost of DG installation is more substantial than its benefits. Also, based on this figure, as the dead
zone width is increased, the annual profit for lower (higher) penetration levels increases (decreases). This is
because of the fact that as the dead zone is broadened, the reward and penalty zones of the second RPS move
toward the left and right sides (see Figure 1). Hence, as can be seen in Figure 8, for higher values of the dead
zone width, lower DG penetration will move the AENS from the penalty zone to the dead zone. Consequently,
it can be concluded that as the dead zone width of the second RPS increases, incentives for improving the
AENS decrease.
Dead Zone Width: 0%
Dead Zone Width: 10%

1000

Dead Zone Width: 5%
Dead Zone Width: 15%

Annual Profit (MRial)

800
600
400
200
0
-200

0

4

8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80

DG Penetration Level (%)

-400
-600
-800

Figure 7. Annual profit for diﬀerent values of dead zone width.

4.4.2. Caps of Schemes 2 and 4
As previously mentioned, the reward and penalty caps of the proposed schemes are considered as percentages of
the total cap (e.g., 3% of the company’s annual revenue). In this part, the impacts of the caps associated with
Schemes 2 and 4 on the profit function are examined. To this end, the values of these caps are set at diﬀerent
levels listed in Table 5. These values are chosen in such a way that the sum of each pair is equal to 85% of the
total cap. The company’s annual profit functions correspond to these values and are depicted in Figure 9. It
can be seen from this figure that for penetration levels below 16% the changes in the values of the caps have
no eﬀects on the annual profit. This is because neither Scheme 2 nor Scheme 4 reached its cap. However, for
higher penetration levels, the value of the annual profit decreases as the caps of the fourth scheme decrease.
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Figure 8. Annual profit of Scheme 2 for diﬀerent values of dead zone width.

By referring to Figure 6, it can be inferred that this is caused by the significant eﬀect of the reward cap of the
fourth RPS on the profit function.
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Figure 9. Annual profit for diﬀerent caps of the second and fourth schemes.

Table 5. Values of the caps of Schemes 2 and 4 for performing sensitivity analysis.

Step
Scheme 2
Scheme 4

Reward and penalty caps (%
1
2
3
4 (base case)
30 35 40 45
55 50 45 40

of total cap)
5
6
7
50 55 60
35 30 25

5. Conclusion
In this paper, a regulatory framework is presented to facilitate the integration of DG units in distribution
networks. Improving the reliability level of a system together with minimizing distribution losses are introduced
as criteria of this regulatory procedure. The proposed method is based on the RPSs and four diﬀerent schemes
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are introduced to eﬀectively quantify the main eﬀects of DG on a distribution network. Several algorithms are
then proposed to properly set the values of diﬀerent parameters associated with these RPSs. Finally, in order to
exemplify the proposed method, a case study on a test distribution system is performed. The obtained results
show that this regulatory framework can motivate DISCOs to improve their service quality by employing DG
resources. The study also shows that the values of some parameters associated with the RPSs (dead zone width
and caps of the schemes) can significantly aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of these RPSs. Finally, it is worth noting that
in the numerical study performed in this paper, only the investment in DG resources is considered to evaluate
the eﬀectiveness of the incentive schemes. However, in practice, a DISCO’s managers have many options to
reinforce their network and improve quality indices. Hence, investigation of the eﬀects of the incentive-based
regulatory framework on a DISCO’s project selection is proposed as a good topic for future work.
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[18] Picciariello A, Alvehag K, Söder L. State-of-art review on regulation for distributed generation integration in
distribution systems. In: International Conference on the European Energy Market; 10–12 May 2012; Florence,
Italy.
[19] Abedi SM, Haghifam MR. Second revenue stream for distributed generation in the presence of reliability insurance.
Int J Elec Power 2014; 59: 29-35.
[20] Mohammadnezhad-Shourkaei H, Fotuhi-Firuzabad M. Principal requirements of designing the reward-penalty
schemes for reliability improvement in distribution systems. In: International Conference on Electricity Distribution; 6–9 June 2011; Frankfurt, Germany.
[21] Billinton R, Pan Z. Historic performance-based distribution system risk assessment. IEEE T Power Deliver 2004; 19:
1759-1765.
[22] Billinton R, Allan RN. Reliability Evaluation of Power Systems. New York, NY, USA: Plenum Press, 1984.
[23] Brown RE. Electric Power Distribution Reliability. 2nd ed. Boca Raton, FL, USA: CRC Press, 2008.
[24] Khalesi N, Rezaei N, Haghifam MR. DG allocation with application of dynamic programming for loss reduction
and reliability improvement. Int J Elec Power 2011; 33: 288-295.
[25] Fumagalli E, Schiavo L, Delestre F. Service Quality Regulation in Electricity Distribution and Retail. Berlin,
Germany: Springer Science & Business Media, 2007.
[26] Council of European Energy Regulators. Fifth CEER Benchmarking Report on the Quality of Electricity Supply
2011. Brussels, Belgium: CEER, 2012.
[27] Billinton R, Jonnavithula S. A test system for teaching overall power system reliability assessment. IEEE T Power
Syst 1996; 11: 1670-1676.

4130

